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PERSON V. POTENTIAL: JUDICIAL STRUGGLES TO
DECIDE CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE DEATH OF AN
EMBRYO OR FETUSg AND MICHIGAN’S STRUGGLE TO
SETTLE THE QUESTION
Dena M. Marks∗

I. INTRODUCTION - OVERVIEW AND SCOPE
“Death is well understood; it’s life that isn’t.”1 We recognize
death, but state by state, courts struggle to understand life when called
on to determine whether their states’ wrongful death acts apply after the
death of an embryo or fetus.2 These struggles arise because, for the most
part, state legislatures have failed to clarify3 whether a cause of action
may be maintained under their wrongful death acts for the death of an
embryo or fetus.4 This failure has lead to inconsistent and unfair results,
often allowing the tortfeasor to benefit from causing the greater harm of
death, when the tortfeasor would have been liable if only injury had
resulted.5
g

Embryo: “In humans, the developing organism from conception until approximately the
end of the second month.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 501 (25th ed. 1990). Fetus: “In
humans, the product of conception from the end of the eighth week to the moment of birth.” Id. at
573.
∗

Associate Professor and Assistant Dean, J.D. Program, Thomas M. Cooley Law School,
Oakland (MI) Campus.
1. Members of the Famous Quotes and Famous Sayings Network, Famous Quotes and
Famous Sayings Network, http://home.att.net/~quotesexchange/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2003)
(attributing the quotation to Tony Follari).
2. Appellate courts in nearly every state have been called on to decide whether a cause of
action for wrongful death can be maintained after the death of an embryo or fetus, See infra notes
34-428 and accompanying text. Yet only four, and arguably five, states have specifically passed
legislation to provide the answer to that question. See infra notes 358-85, 429-39 and accompanying
text.
3. In Michigan, lack of clarity is not the result of legislative inaction, it is the product of
misguided legislative action. See infra notes 440-74 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 37-384 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Gorke v. LeClerc, 181 A.2d 448, 451 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962).
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In Part II of this article, the history and purpose of wrongful death
acts are examined. Part III examines, state by state, the inconsistent
results caused by legislative failure to act. Part IV focuses on the
inconsistent results within one jurisdiction, Michigan, and examines that
state’s legislative attempt to provide the guidance called for in the
article. Part V suggests a redrafted version of the Michigan statute, to
clearly provide the guidance needed by the court. Finally, Part VI
challenges state legislatures to respond to the problem by passing
legislation that clarifies and directs the courts how to understand life, as
it applies to embryonic or fetal death.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Purpose of Wrongful Death Acts
Wrongful death acts developed because, under English common
law, a personal injury action did not survive the victim’s death.6 As a
result, there was “no compensation for the victim’s dependents or
heirs,”7 making it “cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to
injure him.”8 In England, this inequity was first remedied with the
passage of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846.9 This Act was commonly
known as Lord Campbell’s Act, and it created the basis for modern-day
wrongful death statutes in the United States.10 Lord Campbell’s Act
permitted a claim to be brought “for the benefit of the wife, husband,
parent or child of the person whose death shall have been so caused” by
the tortfeasor.11 Now, in every state, if a person dies as a result of the
defendant’s wrongdoing, a cause of action is available.12

6. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 125A at 940 (5th ed. 1984).
7. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 525 (W. Va. 1995) (relying on KEETON, ET. AL., supra
note 6, § 127 at 945).
8. KEETON, supra note 6, § 127 at 945.
9. Id. The “Act permitted recovery of damages by the close relatives of a victim who was
tortiously killed.” Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 525.
10. Id. at 525 (noting that New York enacted the first state wrongful death statute in 1847).
11. O’Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785, 793 (Mich. 1971) (quoting Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich.
180, 194 (1867)). Thus, “the English Parliament rectified the disparity between a tortfeasor’s
liability for injuries and for the more egregious harm, death.” Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 525.
12. KEETON, supra note 6, § 127 at 945. In some jurisdictions, the action that would have
been the decedent’s is preserved as a survival action. Id. § 125A at 942. The injury to the
decedent’s survivors is preserved as a wrongful death action. Id. at 940-41. Some jurisdictions
have combined the two types of injuries into one statute usually referring to the action as a wrongful
death action. Id. at 942. Unless otherwise noted, in this article, the cause of action referred to and
analyzed is a wrongful death action, even if the jurisdiction also has a survival statute.
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B. Wrongful Death Claims for the In Utero Death of an Embryo or
Fetus13
Even after wrongful death statutes were enacted, courts continued
to deny recovery for the death of an unborn embryo or fetus.14 In
denying recovery, the courts stated that the unborn embryo or fetus was
merely a part of the mother, and not a person, and a defendant could not
owe a duty if the unborn fetus or embryo was not a person in existence.15
Under this view, no court permitted a wrongful death claim, unless the
child was first born alive.16
C. Born Alive
The born-alive rule persisted in wrongful death actions even after
the courts began allowing recovery for other injuries incurred
prenatally.17 The courts used four theories to deny a cause of action for
the wrongful death of an unborn embryo or fetus: lack of precedent;18
the single entity theory;19 potential for fraudulent claims or double
recovery;20 or an inability to expand the scope of liability created by the
legislature in enacting the wrongful death statute.21 Some jurisdictions
still require a live birth before a wrongful death cause of action is
allowed.22

13. In general, the common law did not permit a cause of action for any tort committed
against the unborn. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526. This changed in 1946 when the court, in Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), held a claim could be brought on behalf of a child after she
was born for injuries that she suffered as a viable fetus. Id. at 143. Before that, courts had denied
tort recovery for these injuries based on the “assumption that a child en ventre sa mere has no
juridical existence, and is so intimately united with its mother as to be a ‘part’ of her and as a
consequence is not to be regarded as a separate, distinct, and individual entity.” Id. at 139. This
article deals only with causes of action where the injury to the unborn embryo or fetus was death.
14. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), overruled by,
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967).
15. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139.
16. The first published case in the United States to recognize a wrongful death cause of action
without a live birth was Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
17. See, e.g., Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 305-06 (Fla. 1977).
18. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529. See also White v. Yup, 458 P2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1969);
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Wis. 1967).
19. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529.
20. Id. See also Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, 919 (Mass. 1975).
21. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 530.
22. See infra notes 34-119 and accompanying text.
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D. Viability23
In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court was the first to reject the
born-alive rule, in favor of the viability rule.24 In Verkennes v. Corniea25
the court held that a viable fetus was not a single entity with its mother
because it was capable of life separate and independent from her.26 The
court said that the mother may die, but the child may still live on.27 The
single-entity theory was, therefore, found to be irreconcilable with
medical reality28 and was rejected by the court.29 Over time, most
jurisdictions have adopted the viability rule in wrongful death actions.30
E. Previability
Recently, some jurisdictions have allowed a wrongful death claim
even when the tortfeasor’s action resulted in the death of an embryo or
previable fetus.31 Some of these jurisdictions have done so as a result of
legislation specifically enacted to create a cause of action for the death
of an embryo or fetus,32 while others were a result of a court’s
interpretation of the jurisdiction’s general wrongful death act.33
III. JURISDICTIONAL BREAKDOWN BY VIEW APPLIED IN A WRONGFUL
DEATH CLAIM FOR AN EMBRYO OR FETUS
A. Born Alive
Although these jurisdictions are in a minority, arguably, there are
fourteen jurisdictions that still bar a cause of action for the death of a
fetus unless the fetus is ultimately born alive.34

23.
500 g in
1990).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

“Capability of living; the state of being viable; usually connotes a fetus that has reached
weight and 20 gestational weeks.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1714 (25th ed.
Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
Id.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 840.
Id.
Id. at 841.
See infra notes 120-349 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 350-85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 358-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 354-57, 376-85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35-119 and accompanying text.
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1. Alaska
Alaska has no published opinions discussing whether a viable fetus
is a person under the state’s wrongful death act.35 But in Mace v. Jung,36
the federal district court held that a previable fetus was not a person
under Alaska’s wrongful death act.37 In its analysis, the court first
recognized that until 1946 a wrongful death action was unavailable for
the death of a fetus; the child had to be born alive.38 The court then
looked to outside jurisdictions and concluded that, although there was a
growing trend permitting a cause of action for the death of a viable fetus,
it found no basis for allowing recovery for a previable fetus’s death.39
Thus, the court denied this cause of action and left intact the prevailing
rule that a child must be born alive before a wrongful death claim could
be maintained.40
2. California
Justus v. Atchinson41 involved the deaths of two full-term fetuses.42
Although the court recognized that many jurisdictions would permit a
wrongful death cause of action under these circumstances,43 the court
stated that it could not recognize a cause of action here because the
cause of action was merely “a creature of statute . . . [that] ‘exists only
so far and in favor of such person as the legislative power may
declare.’”44 Further, the court stated that the wrongful death act
permitted recovery only for the death of “a person,”45 and the court
reasoned that, because the common law interpretation of person did not
include a fetus, and because “the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include the unborn,”46 the legislature did not
35. See Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706, 707 (D. Alaska 1962).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 708.
38. Id. at 707.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 707, 708.
41. Justus v. Atchinson, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977), overruled in part by Ochoa v. Superior
Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985) (overruling the Atchinson court’s holdings on the “claim of shock”
cause of action).
42. Id. at 125.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 129 (quoting Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co., 129 P. 989, 992 (Cal. 1913)). The
Justus court also stated that the wrongful death act should not be liberally construed to fulfill a
remedial purpose because it is in abrogation of the common law, and, therefore, it must be strictly
construed. Id. at 133.
45. Id. at 129.
46. Id. at 131 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973)).
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intend the word person in the wrongful death act to include an unborn
fetus.47 Finally, the court reasoned that the statute could not create a
cause of action for the death of these stillborn fetuses because the
legislature did not “confer legal personality on unborn fetuses” in the
wrongful death act.48 Instead of including these unborn fetuses in the
wrongful death act, the legislature “impliedly but plainly exclude[d]”
them.49
3. Florida
Similarly, the Florida courts have concluded that a live birth is
required to create a cause of action for wrongful death.50 In Stern v.
Miller,51 a viable fetus52 was stillborn following an automobile
accident.53 The court held that the wrongful death act did not create a
cause of action for a stillborn fetus.54 That court stated that, although
many jurisdictions would have allowed this claim, and although the
wrongful death statute was remedial and should be interpreted liberally,
it was constrained to interpret the statute consistent with legislative
intent.55 In evaluating legislative intent, the court noted that the
legislature had enacted other legislation that specifically provided for an
unborn child, but in the wrongful death act, it did not.56 Therefore, the
court concluded that the legislature’s intent was to exclude a cause of
action under the wrongful death act for the death of an unborn fetus.57
The court further reasoned that because the legislature knew of the
court’s previous exclusion of these claims under the earlier act, if it had
intended unborn fetuses to have a cause of action under the amended
wrongful death act, it would have specifically provided for that in the
amendment.58
47. Id. at 133-34.
48. Id. at 132.
49. Id. The court relied primarily on the legislature’s enactment of statutes where fetal rights
were specifically granted: tort recovery for prenatal injury; property rights; and penal statutes. Id.
50. See, e.g., Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
51. Id.
52. The fetus was of seven-months gestational age. Id. at 304.
53. Id. at 305.
54. Id. at 307. The court had previously interpreted Florida’s Wrongful Death of Minors Act,
section 768.03 and denied a cause of action for the death of a stillborn fetus. Id. at 305. That act
was repealed in 1972, and the one now being interpreted by the court was enacted. Id. at 306. The
1972 act created one “general action for the wrongful death of any ‘person.’” Id.
55. Id. at 308.
56. Id. at 306-07.
57. Id. at 307.
58. Id. at 308.
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4. Indiana
In Indiana, the child wrongful death statute does not create a cause
of action, unless there is a live birth.59 In Bolin v. Wingert, although the
fetus was previable at the time of its death, the Indiana Supreme Court
did not do a viability analysis to determine whether a wrongful death
action could be maintained.60 Rather, the court looked solely at the
language of the state’s Child Wrongful Death Statute.61 The court said
that because the wrongful death act was in derogation of the common
law, it should be strictly construed.62 The court reasoned that, because
the legislature failed to provide specifically for a cause of action for the
death of an unborn fetus, unlike its action in enacting parts of the penal
code, the legislature’s intent was to exclude a cause of action under this
statute, unless there was a live birth.63
5. Iowa
Iowa death statutes are survival statutes, and they do not “create a
new cause of action in a decedent’s survivors.”64 Therefore, in Iowa,
only those born alive have “attained a recognized individual identity”
required to maintain a cause of action under the state’s death act.65 In
Weitl v. Moes, the court held that the stillbirth of a viable fetus did not
create a cause of action because it was not a death of a person.66 In its
analysis, the court began by stating that, at common law, an unborn fetus
was not a person.67 The court reasoned that because a wrongful death
claim was in derogation of the common law, created only by legislation,
if the legislature had also intended to abrogate the common-law meaning
59. Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind. 2002).
60. The court stated that the two parties disagreed about the applicability of the statute
because the defendant claimed that the fetus must be viable before there was a cause of action, and
the plaintiff claimed that the statute was applicable for the death of any unborn child. Id. at 204.
But in its analysis, the court disregarded the issue of the fetus’ viability. Id. at 206-08.
61. IND. CODE § 34-1-1-8(e) (1993), repealed (see IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (1999)). Bolin,
764 N.E.2d at 206-08.
62. Id. at 207.
63. Id.
64. Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270 (Iowa 1981) (plurality), overruled in part by
Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983) (holding
that minor does not have an independent cause of action from statute for parential consortium, and a
minors damages are not limited to the period of the child’s minority).
65. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 271 (quoting Cardwell V. Welch, 213 S.E.2d 382, 383 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1975).
66. Id. at 272. The stillborn’s mother was misdiagnosed and incorrectly treated for bronchitis,
which resulted in brain damage, blindness, and stillbirth of the near-term fetus. Id. at 261.
67. Id. at 271 (relying on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC

48

2/16/2004 11:01 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:41

of person to include a fetus, it would have specifically done so.68 The
court further reasoned that there was no legislative intent to include an
unborn fetus under this act because the legislature had not taken any
action to amend this statute after the court’s previous interpretation of
this statute, which required a live birth.69
6. Maine
In Shaw v. Jendzejec,70 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
harshly criticized its own earlier decision71 requiring a live birth before a
wrongful death action could be maintained.72 But it concluded “that the
force of stare decisis compels us to reaffirm” that holding.73 In its
reasoning, the court first looked for a legislative response to its earlier
decision, and found no statutory amendment.74 It also evaluated the
“harshness that results from the live-birth rule,” and found it insufficient
to overrule its prior decision.75 Finally, the court analyzed courts’
interpretations from other jurisdictions since its earlier decision, and it
found that only Montana and Hawaii had yet adopted the viability
view.76 Based on these findings, the Maine Supreme Court found
insufficient reason to recognize a wrongful death cause of action without
a live birth.77
7. Nebraska
In 1977, the Nebraska Supreme Court confirmed that there must be
a live birth before there was a cause of action under the state’s wrongful
death act,78 and that the stillbirth of a viable fetus was insufficient to
create a wrongful death cause of action.79 The court stated that because
a child born dead was not a person within the law of torts, its death could
68. Id. at 271. In fact, the court pointed out, that the legislature has done so in penal statutes.
Id.
69. Id. at 272. The court previously excluded a cause of action for the death of a previable
fetus under the same statute. McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971).
70. Shaw v. Jendzejec, 717 A.2d 367 (Me.1998).
71. Miton v. Cary Med. Ctr., 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988).
72. Shaw, 717 A.2d at 369-71.
73. Id. at 368.
74. Id. at 371.
75. Id.
76. Id. at n.10.
77. Id. at 371-72.
78. Egbert v. Wenzl, 260 N.W.2d 480 (Neb. 1977). The case upheld a 26 year-old decision:
Drabbels v Skelly Oil Co., 50 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 1951).
79. The fetus was eight-months gestational age. Egbert, 260 N.W.2d at 481.
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not create a cause of action under the state’s wrongful death act.80 The
court further stated that because the cause of action was strictly
statutory, and not a “matter of ‘evolution’ of the common law,” only
legislative intent in enacting the statute should be used to interpret it.81
And the court reasoned that the legislature’s failure to define an unborn
fetus as a person under the act, despite 26 years to do so, indicated the
legislature’s intent to exclude unborn fetuses under the act.82
8. New Jersey
In New Jersey, the courts have held that because wrongful death
was not actionable at common law, the cause of action should only be
allowed for the death of a person, as provided in the statute.83 In
Giardina v. Bennett, the court held that the death of a viable fetus did not
create a cause of action under the state’s wrongful death act.84 The court
stated that, at common law, an unborn fetus was “merely a part of his
mother without separate existence or personality,” and because the
legislature had specifically addressed legal protection for the unborn in
property and penal statutes, its failure to do so here made it “inferable
that the Legislature adopted [the] common law understanding of the
concept of a ‘person’ in the adoption of the Wrongful Death Act.”85 The
court further reasoned that the legislature’s failure to amend the Act
despite the court’s similar, previous interpretations also indicated that
the legislature intended to exclude these causes of action under the
statute.86 The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions allowed a
cause of action for viable fetuses, but the court stated that this merely
substituted “one bright-line rule, viability, for another, live-birth,” and
that there was “no compelling underlying policy that would impel [it] to
give the statutory term ‘person’ an expansive interpretation.”87
9. New York
In New York, there is no wrongful death cause of action for a
stillborn fetus.88 In Endres v. Friedbert, the court affirmed its long-held
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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interpretation that “the law has never considered the unborn fetus as
having a separate ‘juridical existence’ or a legal personality or identity
‘until it sees the light of day.’”89 Although the court acknowledged that
other jurisdictions permitted a cause of action at viability, the court
reasoned that this would only relocate the point at which the cause of
action would be recognized, and it would “increase a hundredfold the
problems of causation and damages.”90 “[A] tangible and concrete event
would be the most acceptable and workable boundary. Birth, being a
definite, observable and significant event, meets this requirement.”91
The court also stated that “the damages recoverable by the parents in
their own right afford ample redress for the wrong done.”92
10. Tennessee
In Hamby v. McDaniel,93 the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed
its earlier decision94 that there is no wrongful death cause of action for a
viable, stillborn fetus.95 The court said that the wrongful death action is
to be “strictly construed against the maintenance of any right of action
not expressly provided for [in the act].”96 The court said that the use of
the word person did not create an “ambiguity in our Wrongful Death
Statute[,] [and] [w]e must consider it as it is written, not as we would
have it.”97 The court also reasoned that because the statute had been
amended without changes to include a cause of action for an unborn
fetus, it presumed that the legislature approved of its earlier
interpretation of the word person as it was used in the statute.98
11. Texas
In Texas, the legislature amended the wrongful death act, changing
the phrase “death of any person” to “an individual’s death.”99 The Texas
89. Id. at 904 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 905.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977).
94. Durrett v. Owens, 371 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. 1963).
95. Hamby, 559 S.W.2d at 777.
96. Id. at 776.
97. Id. at 776 (quoting Hogan v. McDaniel, 319 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tenn. 1958)).
98. Id. The court also relied on its interpretation of the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Hamby court interpreted the Roe decision to say
that the use of the word “person” in the Constitution had “no prenatal application.” Hamby, 559
S.W.2d at 777.
99. Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1987).
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Supreme Court held that the substitution was not intended to create a
substantive change, and it affirmed its earlier interpretation that the
state’s wrongful death act did not create a cause of action unless there
was a live birth.100 The court stated that although the statute is remedial,
and should be liberally construed, the court “may not rewrite the statute
in the guise of construing it.”101 The court said that it found no
“evidence of legislative intent to include an unborn fetus within the
scope of our Wrongful Death Act.”102
12. Utah
Despite several opportunities, the Supreme Court of Utah has never
directly decided whether a viable fetus is a person under the state’s
wrongful death act.103 But it has never allowed recovery in a wrongful
death claim for the death of a viable or pre-viable embryo or fetus.104 In
1942, the Utah Supreme Court held that no damages could be awarded
for the loss of an unborn child, but that the mother could recover
damages for her injuries as a result of a miscarriage.105 Although the
case did not discuss the gestational age of the fetus or embryo, because
there was some dispute about whether the plaintiff was indeed pregnant
at all, it is likely that it was not viable.106
In 1975, the court evaluated a claim brought for the death of a fullterm, viable fetus who was stillborn.107 The court relied on the holding
of a 1942 case,108 but it did not discuss whether the lower court erred in
permitting the wrongful death cause of action, because the jury had not
found the defendants liable, so no damages were awarded under that
theory.109
In 1996, the court evaluated a claim brought by the would-be
grandparents of a fetus.110 Both the fetus and the plaintiffs’ pregnant,
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 505. The court also held that there were no damages available under the state’s
survival action. Id. at 506. The court stated that damages for the fetus’ medical and funeral could
be recovered as a part of the mother’s damages. Id. And it found that any physical pain and
suffering the fetus may have suffered were “far too speculative. . . . [and that] there is not even the
possibility of proof to support the cause of action.” Id.
103. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
104. Id.
105. Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942).
106. Id. at 118.
107. Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975).
108. Id. at 1077 (relying on Webb 132 P.2d at 114).
109. Id.
110. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1996).
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minor daughter died as a result of a car accident.111 The court held that
the grandparents had no standing to bring a wrongful death action for the
death of the fetus because they were neither the parent nor the guardian
of the fetus.112 The court did not decide whether the fetus was a person
under the wrongful death act.113
13. Virginia
In Virginia, there is no wrongful death action for the death of a
viable fetus; the child must be born alive.114 In Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co., the court stated that it could not presume that the legislature
intended the word person, as used in the wrongful death act, to mean
anything more than the word’s common understanding.115 The court
stated that in other statutes, the legislature had specifically extended the
meaning of the word person, but it did not do so here.116 And because
the legislature failed to specifically extend the meaning of the word, the
court stated, “[w]e are unwilling to hold that a child En ventre sa mere
can maintain a common law action for personal injuries.”117 Therefore,
if the “decedent had no right . . . to maintain an action [because the
viable fetus was not a person within the meaning of the wrongful death
act] . . . then the right to maintain the present action could not be
transmitted to her personal representative.”118
14. Wyoming
There are no published cases addressing whether a viable or a
previable fetus is a person under Wyoming’s wrongful death act.119 So it
is unclear whether this jurisdiction would abandon the born-alive rule,
but as yet, it has not done so.

111. Id. 1184-85.
112. Id. at 1186-87.
113. Id. at 1187 & n. 4.
114. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Va. 1969). The court applied the
born-alive rule and permitted a cause of action for the death of a previable fetus, who was born alive
at 21 weeks gestation, and who died approximately one and one half hours later. Kalafut v. Gruver,
389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990) (explaining the reasoning of the Lawrence court).
115. Lawrence, 169 S.E.2d at 441.
116. Id. at 441-42.
117. Id. at 441.
118. Id.
119. Jill D. Washburn Helbling, To Recover or Not to Recover: A State By State Survey of
Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363, 429 (1996).
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B. Viability
The majority of jurisdictions allow a wrongful death action to be
maintained for the death of a viable fetus.120
1. Alabama
In Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores,121 the Alabama Supreme Court first
decided that there was a cause of action for the wrongful death of a
viable fetus.122 The court stated that the “purpose of our wrongful death
statute[] . . . is the preservation of human life.”123 The court reasoned
that this purpose would be defeated if this cause of action was denied, so
the court, “extending its judicial prerogative,” recognized this cause of
action.124
But in Gentry v. Gilmore,125 the court held that there was no
wrongful death cause of action for a stillborn, previable fetus.126 Here,
the court first stated that no jurisdiction permitted a cause of action for a
fetus of 13 weeks gestation.127 The court also recognized that, following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,128 the point of viability is
one of significance.129 Therefore, the court held that a previable fetus
was not a minor child under the applicable wrongful death act.130
2. Arizona
In Summerfield v. Superior Court,131 the court held that a stillborn,
viable fetus was a person under the state’s wrongful death act.132 The
court began its analysis by examining “whether [it] was truly bound by
legislative intent [in enacting the wrongful death act] or [was] free to
apply a modicum of common law policy.”133 The court concluded that
there was an uncertainty here as to whether Arizona recognized a

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

See infra notes 121-349 and accompanying text.
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974).
Id. at 355.
Id. at 356 (citations omitted).
Id. at 356, 357.
Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1993).
Id. at 1244.
Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1244.
Id.
Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 724 (Ariz. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 715.
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common law claim for a wrongful death.134 The court stated that, even if
the legislature “believed that it was creating a new statutory right of
action in enacting the Wrongful Death Act, there [was] no evidence to
suggest that it intended to occupy the field completely,” so the court
concluded that it could apply “common law attributes” in interpreting
the wrongful death act.135
The court stated that the legislature intended the wrongful death
action to compensate survivors.136 Additionally, in other laws, the
legislature had protected fetal life.137 So the court then reasoned that it
was appropriate to allow this cause of action because it would
compensate the fetus’s survivors and provide protection for fetal life.138
The court did not find any conflict with the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling in Roe because, it concluded, “[t]he word ‘person’ can
mean different things in different contexts.”139 Further a woman’s right
to choose is “very different” than the tortious termination of the
pregnancy “against the mother’s will.”140
Finally, the court stated that legislative inaction here should not be
interpreted as an indication that the legislature intended to exclude a
viable fetus under the wrongful death act.141
3. Arkansas
In Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n, Inc.,142 the Arkansas Supreme
Court overruled precedent143 and held that a viable, stillborn fetus was a
person under the state’s wrongful death act.144 In its reasoning, the court
reexamined its prior holding, where it had concluded that legislative
action was required to make a viable fetus a person under the wrongful
death act.145
Therefore, in this case, the court looked for that legislative
action.146 Although the Legislature had not amended the wrongful death
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 716.
Id. at 717, 718.
Id. at 721.
Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 721 (Ariz. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 722-23 (referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
Id.
Id. at 724.
Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n Inc., 42 S.W.3d 508 (Ark. 2001).
Chatelain v. Kelley, 910 S.W.2d 215 (Ark. 1995).
Aka, 42 S.W.3d at 519.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 516.
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act, in a criminal act, it had defined a person to include “an unborn child
in utero at any stage of development.”147 Further, the court looked at
public policy and found that the “people’s passage of Amendment 68 . . .
declares that ‘[t]he policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of every
unborn child from conception until birth.’”148 The court concluded that
there was, therefore, sufficient reason to break from precedent, and that a
viable fetus was a person under the state’s wrongful death act.149
4. Colorado
In Espadero v. Feld,150 the court held that a viable fetus was a
person within the meaning of Colorado’s wrongful death act.151 The
court stated that it was likely that the state’s legislature “gave no
thought” to whether the word person, as used in this statute, included a
fetus.152 Therefore, the court looked to the legislature’s intent in
enacting the wrongful death statute.153 The court concluded that the
intent was to preserve and protect human life and that if it barred this
claim, it would “frustrate the legislature’s intent.”154 Additionally, it
would be inequitable to permit a cause of action for fetal injury suffered
by a viable fetus, but deny a cause of action if that injury was so severe
that it caused death.155 The court concluded, therefore, that there was a
cause of action for the death of this full-term, viable fetus.156
5. Connecticut
In Gorke v. Le Clerc,157 the court held that the estate of a stillborn,
viable fetus could bring a cause of action for the wrongful death of this
fetus.158 The court relied on two superior court decisions159 that had
allowed recovery for fetal injuries when the child was later born alive.160
147. Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102,(13)(B)(i)(Mitchie 1999)).
148. Id. at 517 (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2).
149. Id. at 518.
150. Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Colo. 1986).
151. Id. at 1484.
152. Id. at 1483.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1484.
156. Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (D. Colo. 1986).
157. Gorke v. Le Clerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962).
158. Id. at 451.
159. Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 111 A.2d 14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955) ; Prates v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 A.2d 633 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955).
160. Gorke, 181 A.2d at 451.
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“Implicit in the principle that damages for non-fatal prenatal injuries to a
viable fetus are recoverable is a recognition that there exists to such an
unborn child a duty of care for the breach of which the wrongdoer may
be held liable.”161 The court reasoned that because this fetus was
capable of living independently at the time it was injured, it should make
“no difference in liability whether the wrongfully inflicted injuries to the
viable fetus result[ed] in death just prior to birth or in death just after
birth.”162
6. Delaware
In Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc.,163 the court held that the
administrator for the estate of a stillborn, viable fetus could maintain a
wrongful death cause of action.164 The court examined opinions from
outside jurisdictions and noted that most had found that a viable fetus
has a separate existence from its mother and, as such, was “entitled to
sue either on its own behalf or through an administrator, depending upon
whether it survived the accident.”165 Following these other jurisdictions,
the court concluded that a wrongful death claim could be maintained in
this case.166
7. Hawaii
In Wade v. United States,167 the court held that a wrongful death
cause of action could be maintained if a stillborn fetus was viable at the
time of the death.168 Having no Hawaii cases on point, the court
surveyed other jurisdictions and concluded that “principles of fairness
and justice” required it to recognize a cause of action here because it
would be unfair to permit a wrongful death cause of action for a child
who died right after birth as a result of a prenatal injury, but deny a
wrongful death cause of action on behalf of one who died just before his
or her birth from the prenatal injury.169 The court further stated that it
made no sense to deny this cause of action because it would only serve

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Wade v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573 (D. Haw. 1990).
Id. at 1579.
Id.
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to immunize the tortfeasor from liability for causing the greater harm.170
The court followed the majority of courts in other jurisdictions and held
that, in its best estimate, the Hawaii Supreme Court would allow “a
cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus who could have
sustained life outside the womb,” and that it would “limit the cause of
action to [the] wrongful death of a viable fetus only.”171
8. Idaho
In Volk v. Baldazo,172 the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was
a cause of action under the wrongful death act for the death of a
stillborn, viable fetus.173 Here, the court began by stating that before the
wrongful death act would apply, there must first be the right “to
maintain an action for the injury” if the fetus had survived.174 The court
recognized that the right to bring a cause of action for injury was “to be
decided under the common law of torts and [it] is not controlled by
legislative intent.”175 So, based on a majority of opinions from other
jurisdictions, the court held that a cause of action for prenatal injuries
was available to a viable fetus who was later born alive.176 Thus, this
fetus would have had a cause of action for the injuries suffered if it had
been born alive.177 Next, the court stated that the wrongful death act had
two purposes: provide compensation and “deter wrongful conduct.”178
The court then concluded that if it denied this cause of action, it would
subvert these legislative purposes, so it permitted the cause of action.179
In Santana v. Zilog, Inc.,180 the court held that there was no cause of
action for the death of a previable fetus.181 Having no Idaho precedent
to follow, the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance.182 The
court noted that most jurisdictions denied a wrongful death cause of
action for a previable fetus.183 Although it recognized several reasons

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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Id. In this case, the viability of the fetuses was at issue. Id. at 1579-80.
Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Volk, 651 P.2d at 15.
Id.
Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 783.
Id.
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why other courts held this way, this court focused its analysis on the lack
of “clear legislative direction.”184 The court stated that only five states
had recognized this type of claim, and because only one of those did so
without “action by the legislature,” this court reasoned that the Idaho
courts would have denied this claim until they too had a clear directive
from the Idaho legislature.185
9. Kansas
In Hale v. Manion,186 the court, following precedent from outside
jurisdictions, held that a stillborn, viable fetus was a person under the
wrongful death act.187 The court found it unnecessary to set forth its
specific reasons for doing so and, instead, referred the reader to
scholarly discussions on the subject.188 But in Humes v. Clinton,189
again following precedent from outside jurisdictions, the court held that
there was no cause of action under the wrongful death act for the death
of a previable fetus.190 The court reasoned that viability was necessary
to maintain a wrongful death cause of action because “a nonviable fetus
is not capable of living outside its mother’s womb,” so it “never
bec[a]me an independent living person” who could have maintained a
cause of action if death had not ensued.191 Further, the court stated that
extending a cause of action to a previable fetus was a policy decision
best left to the legislature.192
10. Kentucky
In Mitchell v. Couch,193 the court held that a viable, stillborn fetus
was a person within the meaning of the wrongful death act.194 The court
stated that “a viable unborn child is an entity within the meaning of the
general word ‘person’ . . . because, biologically speaking, such a child is,
in fact, a presently existing person, a living human being.”195

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 784.
Id. at 784, 786.
Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan.1962).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032 (Kan. 1990).
Id. at 1037.
Id.
Id.
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955).
Id. at 906.
Id. at 905.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss1/2

18

Marks: Person v. Potential
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC

2/16/2004 11:01 AM

PERSON V. POTENTIAL

2004]

59

11. Maryland
In State v. Sherman,196 the court held that there was a cause of
action for the death of a viable fetus.197 The court, relying on a decision
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that recognized a child’s cause of
action for injuries incurred prenatally,198 stated that it saw no reason why
the cause of action “should be cut off because of the child’s death before
birth” because, it stated, “[t]he cause of action arose at the time of the
injury.”199
And in Group Health Ass’n v. Blumenthal,200 the court held that a
wrongful death cause of action could be maintained when a previable
fetus was born alive.201 The court stated that “viability has no role in a
case . . . where the child is born alive.”202 The court rejected the
appellee’s argument that this cause of action should be barred by the
United States Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. Wade.203 The court stated
that recognizing a wrongful death cause of action did “not impinge on
the [Supreme] Court’s decision in Roe” because the fact that the mother
could have chosen to abort did “not lesson the alleged negligence
leading to the child’s premature birth.”204
But in Kandel v. White,205 the court did not extend the cause of
action to include a stillborn, previable fetus.206 The court stated that
there could be no wrongful death cause of action unless there was an
“independent living person.”207 And because a previable stillborn fetus
did not and could not live apart from its mother, no wrongful death
action could be maintained.208
12. Massachusetts
In Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,209 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held for the first time that a viable fetus was a person under the
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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State v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964).
Id. at 73.
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951).
Sherman, 198 A.2d at 73.
Group Health Ass’n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198 (Md. 1983).
Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1206 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
Id. at 1207.
Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264 (Md. 1995).
Id. at 1267.
Id.
Id. at 1270 (quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 136-37 (N.H. 1980)).
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975).
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state’s wrongful death act.210 Previously, the court had rejected the
viability rule because it had no precedent to allow it; “it would be more
appropriate for the Legislature to make such a change” and it would
“subject the court to speculation and would not be easily administered
under our statute.”211 But here, the court reasoned that because the
majority of jurisdictions now allowed a cause of action when a fetus was
viable, there was precedent to rely on.212 Further, the court stated that it
also had precedent to alter its “interpretation of statutory language[] in
an area now considered a part of the common law.”213 Finally, the court
said that “the nature of damages recoverable cannot justify denying a
right of action.”214 Therefore, the court concluded that it could find
neither “reason nor logic” to deny a cause of action for the death of this
viable fetus.215
In Torigian v. Watertown News Co.,216 a previable fetus was born
alive and died within a few hours.217 The court, stating that in “the vast
majority of cases where the present issue has arisen, recovery has been
allowed,” held that there was a cause of action under the wrongful death
act.218
Finally, in Thibert v. Milka,219 the court confirmed its two prior
decisions, but refused to extend its interpretation of person to a previable
fetus that was not born alive.220 The court reasoned that to have a cause
of action, the fetus must have had a “separate existence” from its mother,
but “ [w]here a nonviable fetus is stillborn, . . . the fetus could not have
had an independent existence,” and “therefore, [there is] no separate
cause of action for its death.”221
13. Minnesota
In Verkennes v. Corniea,222 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held

210. Id. at 920.
211. Id. at 917.
212. Id. at 918.
213. Id. at 919. To do so, the court relied on Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972),
and Diaz v. Eli Lily & Co., 300 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 1973).
214. Mone, 331 N.E. 2d at 919.
215. Id.
216. Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 927.
219. Thibert v. Milka , 646 N.E.2d. 1025 (Mass. 1995).
220. Id. at 1026.
221. Id. at 1027.
222. Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
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that there was a wrongful death cause of action for a stillborn, viable
fetus.223 As a novel issue in 1949, the court recognized that a majority
of courts would not recognize this cause of action, so it looked to the
writings of legal scholars and the reasoning used by courts permitting a
cause of action for prenatal torts, and stated that “where independent
existence is possible and life destroyed[,] . . . a cause of action arises.”224
14. Mississippi
In Rainey v. Horn,225 the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a
wrongful death cause of action was available for a stillborn, viable
fetus.226 The court stated that “[w]hile the action in this case is a
statutory one, . . . we look to the common law to determine the question
before us.”227 The court reasoned that because a viable fetus was
capable of an “independent existence from its mother,” it was “entitled
to the protection of its person.”228
15. Montana
In Strzelczyk v. Jett,229 the Supreme Court of Montana held that a
viable fetus was a person under the state’s wrongful death act.230 Under
a different statute, the court had previously denied a cause of action for a
stillborn, viable fetus, finding that it was not a minor child under the
applicable statute.231 In its interpretation of the present statute, the court
then relied on the definition of an unborn child taken from another
statute, which stated that “[a] child conceived but not yet born is . . . an
existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event
of its subsequent birth.”232 Based on this definition, the court concluded
that a stillborn, viable fetus was also a person under the state’s wrongful
death act.233
Despite the Strzelczyk court’s reliance on this very broad definition

223. Id. at 841.
224. Id. at 840, 841.
225. Rainey v. Horn, 72 So.2d 434 (Miss. 1954).
226. Id. at 439-40.
227. Id. at 439.
228. Id.
229. Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994).
230. Id. at 733.
231. Id. at 731. In Kuhnke v. Fisher 683 P.2d 916, 919 (Mont. 1984), the court held that a
stillborn, viable fetus was not a “minor child” under the wrongful death act.
232. Strzelczyk, 870 P.2d at 732 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
233. Id. at 733.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC

62

2/16/2004 11:01 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:41

of an “existing person,” the court later denied a cause of action for a
previable fetus that was not born alive.234 In Blackburn v. Blue
Mountain Women’s Clinic, the court, relying on its opinion in Kuhnke v.
Fisher,235 concluded without discussion that there was no cause of action
for the death of a previable fetus.236
16. Nevada
In White v. Yup,237 the Nevada Supreme Court held that there was a
wrongful death cause of action for the stillbirth of a viable fetus.238
First, the court, following the majority of other jurisdictions,239 held that
Nevada recognized a cause of action for prenatal injuries.240 Second, the
court examined opinions from other jurisdictions and held, “based on the
trend of modern authority,” that there was a cause of action for the death
of a viable fetus.241
17. New Hampshire
In Poliquin v. MacDonald,242 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that “a fetus having reached that period of pre-natal maturity where
it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person . . .
[but] if a fetus is non-viable at the time of injury and dies in the womb
its representative can maintain no action” under the wrongful death
act.243 The court stated that because “[t]he common law ha[d] always
been most solicitous for the welfare of the fetus in connection with its
inheritance rights as well as protecting it under the criminal law, . . . a
child [who] can live separate and apart from its mother” should be
permitted to recover for prenatal injuries.244 And if it dies as a result of
those injuries suffered prenatally while it was viable, “an action for

234. Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women’s Clinic, 951 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1997).
235. Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916, 919 (Mont. 1984).
236. Blackburn, 951 P.2d at 6. It should be noted that it was a viable fetus that died in Kuhnke,
and according to this court’s opinion in Strzelczyk v. Jett, the statutory basis for the claim brought in
Kuhnke was amended in 1987. Strzelczyk, 870 P.2d at 732.
237. White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969).
238. Id. at 623-24.
239. The court did not specify its basis for the holding other than the weight of authority. Id. at
621.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 623.
242. Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957).
243. Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
244. Id.
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recovery may be maintained on its behalf.”245
But in Wallace v. Wallace,246 the court held that there was no
wrongful death claim available for a stillborn, previable fetus.247 The
court stated that the question it had to answer was not “when life begins”
but when the court should recognize a cause of action.248 “It is simply a
policy determination that the law will not extend civil liability by giving
a nonviable fetus a cause of action for negligence before it becomes a
person . . . .”249 “In other words, life may begin with conception, but
causes of action do not.”250
18. New Mexico
In Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital,251 the court held that a viable
fetus was a person under the state’s wrongful death act.252 The court,
rather than relying on a common-law argument, evaluated the state’s
criminal statutes in effect at the time that the wrongful death act was
created.253 The court stated that because a viable fetus was protected “in
legislation which dealt with offenses against ‘lives and persons,’” the
legislature intended for a viable fetus to be “protected by legislation
dealing with lives and persons.”254
In 1995, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a previable fetus
who was born alive was not a person under the state’s wrongful death
act.255 “On this issue, we find no clear legislative directive.”256
Therefore, relying on persuasive precedent, the court held that “[a]
nonviable fetus is incapable of living outside its mother’s womb and
cannot be regarded as a separate entity capable of maintaining an
independent action in its own right.”257 The court reasoned that absent a
directive from the legislature, “we consider it sound statutory
245. Id.
246. Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134 (N.H. 1980).
247. Id. at 137.
248. Id. at 136.
249. Id. The court said that legislative inaction should not be considered, and it noted that “it
would be incongruous for a mother to have . . . [the] right to deliberately destroy a nonviable fetus
and at the same time for a third person to be subject to liability . . . [for] negligent acts.” Id. at 137
(citations omitted).
250. Id.
251. Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital, 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
252. Id. at 830.
253. Id. at 829-30.
254. Id. at 830.
255. Miller v. Kirk, 905 P.2d 194 (N.M. 1995).
256. Id. at 195.
257. Id. at 197.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC

64

2/16/2004 11:01 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:41

interpretation to limit the right to maintain an action to a viable fetus.”258
19. North Carolina
In 1987, overruling two court of appeals opinions, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that a viable fetus was a person under the
state’s wrongful death act.259 Although the legislature had not amended
the statute since the prior decisions, the court stated that its inaction and
silence did not imply its approval.260 The court stated that, therefore,
there was no apparent legislative intent, and it turned to the plain
meaning of the statute.261 The court again concluded that the words used
provided no “clear-cut answer” to whether a viable fetus was a person,
so it turned to common law claims for injuries to fetuses.262 “It would be
logical and consistent with these decisions, and would further the policy
of deterring dangerous conduct that underlies them, to allow such claims
when the fetus does not survive.”263 Further, the court analyzed the
recent legislative revision in another statute that stated that “human life
is inherently valuable,”264 and it concluded that a wrongful death action
should be allowed here.265 Despite reaching this conclusion, the court
limited the damages available in the action, specifically excluding as too
speculative damages for lost income, loss of services, and loss of society
and companionship.266
20. North Dakota
When the North Dakota Supreme Court heard Hopkins v.
McBane,267 a wrongful death claim, it had not yet decided whether it
would allow a cause of action for prenatal torts if the child was later
born alive.268 Here, the court concluded that it would allow both
claims.269 In its reasoning, the court relied on the “nearly unanimous
258. Id.
259. DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987) (overruling Yow v. Nance, 224
S.E.2d 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); Cardwell v. Welch, 213 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975)).
260. Id. at 490.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 491-92.
263. Id. at 491.
264. Id. (quoting N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-2).
265. Id. at 493-94.
266. Id. at 494.
267. Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984). The case was heard again by the court
in 1988 on procedural and damages issues. Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1988).
268. Hopkins, 359 N.W.2d at 864.
269. Id. at 864, 865.
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weight of authority” and recognized without discussion that it would
permit a cause of action for a prenatal tort if it was followed by a live
birth.270 After settling that issue, the court, attempting to determine
legislative intent in the wrongful death statute, looked to a different
statute, which provided a definition of when an unborn child was to be
deemed a person.271 The court stated that the legislative intent in that
statute was to “ensure and to protect the interests of a child subsequent
to its conception but prior to it birth.”272 The court then extended the
legislative intent expressed in that statute to the applicable wrongful
death statute, and it held that it should recognize a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a stillborn, viable fetus.273
21. Ohio
In Werling v. Sandy,274 the Ohio Supreme Court held for the first
time that there was a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a
stillborn, viable fetus.275 Ohio had already recognized that a child born
alive could bring a cause of action for injuries he or she suffered
prenatally.276 Thus, the court stated that to deny this claim would only
benefit the tortfeasor for causing the greater harm of death.277 And it
would thwart the remedial nature of the wrongful death act.278 The court
also stated that its decision was consistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade279 because the line of
demarcation here, like in Roe, was viability.280
In 1993, an Ohio court of appeals was asked to recognize a cause of
action for the stillbirth of previable fetus.281 The plaintiff requested that
the court adopt the “quickness” test used in Georgia.282 Although the
court of appeals seemed motivated to accept the plaintiff’s argument, it
left the decision to its state supreme court, and it denied the cause of

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 865.
Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985).
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Werling, 476 N.E. 2d at 1056.
Egan v. Smith, 622 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 1193. See infra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
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action.283
22. Oklahoma
In Evans v. Olson,284 the Oklahoma Supreme Court overruled its
previous decisions285 and held there was a wrongful death cause of
action for the stillbirth of a viable fetus.286 The court stated that a
wrongful death cause of action could be maintained if the decedent
would have had a right to bring an action if he or she had survived the
injury.287 The court then reasoned that because a child who was later
born alive could bring a claim for injuries suffered prenatally, a cause of
action could also be maintained by the fetus’s estate in a wrongful death
claim.288
In Guyer v. Hugo Publishing Co.,289 the court held that there was no
wrongful death cause of action for the miscarriage of a previable
fetus.290 The court stated that binding case law still compelled it to
exclude this cause of action under the wrongful death act because
Evans291 only changed case law regarding viable fetuses.292 Therefore, it
was bound to hold that there was no wrongful death cause of action for a
miscarried, previable fetus.293
But in Nealis v. Baird,294 the court held that a born alive, previable
fetus was “one” under the wrongful death act.295 The court stated that a
live birth conveyed legal status to the previable fetus, even if he was
unable to sustain life.296 The court found no conflict between this
holding and a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion because
“[w]here both the state and the mother have identical interests in

283. Egan, 622 N.E.2d at 1193-94. The court stated: “[T]here is . . . no reason why the State’s
compelling interest in protecting human life should not extend throughout pregnancy rather than
coming into existence only at the point of viability.” Id. at 1194 (quoting Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 494 (1989)).
284. Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976).
285. Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla.
1967).
286. Evans, 550 P.2d at 925.
287. Id. at 927.
288. Id. at 927-28.
289. Guyer v. Hugo Publishing Co., 830 P.2d 1393 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991).
290. Id. at 1394.
291. Evans, 550 P.2d at 924.
292. Guyer, 830 P.2d at 1394.
293. Id.
294. Nealis v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438, 455 (Okla. 1999).
295. Id. at 452-53.
296. Id. at 453, 454.
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preserving the child’s life and in vindicating harm resulting in its death,
Roe poses no legal obstacle.”297
23. Oregon
In Libbee v. Permanente Clinic,298 the court, following the majority
of other jurisdictions, held that there was a wrongful death cause of
action for the death of a stillborn, viable fetus.299 The court also stated
that this holding was consistent with its previous holding300 that a child
later born alive could recover for injuries suffered prenatally, at least
when the child was viable at the time the injury occurred.301 Further, the
court stated that its position was consistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,302 because it too was relying
on viability to create the cause of action here.303
In LaDu v. Oregon Clinic., P.C.,304 an Oregon court of appeals, en
banc, held that a previable fetus was not a person under the Oregon
wrongful death act.305 In interpreting the word “person” used in the act,
the court stated that the plain meaning of the word at the time the statute
was enacted did not include a previable fetus.306 Further, even under
statutes that allow an unborn to inherit a share of an estate, it must still
be born alive before it inherits, so the rights conferred to the unborn
under these statutes did not lead the court to conclude that the legislature
intended the word person to include a previable fetus.307 Finally, the
court examined the anti-abortion statute in effect when the wrongful
death act was created, but it found no contextual relevance.308
Therefore, the court concluded that the wrongful death statute did not
provide a cause of action for the death of a previable fetus.309

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
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Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636 (Or. 1974).
Id. at 640.
Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291 P.2d 225 (Or. 1955).
Libbee, 518 P.2d at 639.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Libbee, 518 P.2d at 640.
LaDu v. Oregon Clinic., P.C., 998 P.2d 733 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
MARKS2-CHRIS EXTRA.DOC

68

2/16/2004 11:01 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:41

24. Pennsylvania
In Amadio v. Levin,310 a divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
for the first time that there was a wrongful death cause of action for the
stillbirth of a viable fetus.311 In very broad language, the majority
opinion stated that it had “acknowledge[d] a child en ventre sa mere to
be an ‘individual,’ ‘having existence as a separate creature from the
moment of conception.’”312 The court stated that it would “[n]o longer
sanction a legal doctrine that enables a tortfeasor who causes death to
escape full liability.”313
But in Coveleski v. Bubnis,314 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that there was no cause of action for the death of a previable fetus.315
The court, relying on cases from other jurisdictions, rejected the claim
and stated that it would wait for legislative direction before expanding
the cause of action to a previable fetus.316 Thus, the court stated that in
Pennsylvania the death of a fetus could be the basis for a wrongful death
claim only if the fetus was born alive or if the fetus was “capable of an
independent existence at the time of death.”317
25. Rhode Island
In Presley v. Newport Hospital,318 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
first considered whether a cause of action for the death of a viable fetus
could be brought under the state’s wrongful death act.319 Here, the court
held that it could.320 The court reasoned that because it recognized a
cause of action for prenatal injuries, it found no “perceptible reason why
there should be a legally recognized difference between a death that
occurs immediately before birth and one that occurs immediately
after.”321 Additionally, the court said that “it makes poor sense to
sanction a legal doctrine that enables the tortfeasor whose deed brings
310. Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985).
311. Id. at 1089.
312. Id. at 1087.
313. Id. at 1088.
314. Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1993).
315. Id. at 610.
316. Id. The court pointed out that the Illinois legislature had done just that. Id.
317. Id. See also Hudak v. Georgy, 634 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1993) (holding that there was a cause of
action under the wrongful death act for triplets that were previable at the time of birth, but who were
born alive and survived for a short period of time).
318. Presley v. Newport Hospital, 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 754.
321. Id. at 753.
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about a stillbirth to escape liability but that renders one whose
wrongdoing is less severe answerable . . . because his victim survives
birth.”322 Although it was, obviously, not necessary in this case, the
court stated that “the decedent, whether viable or nonviable, was a
‘person’ within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act.”323
Although this clear statement would imply that the court was not
requiring that the fetus be viable,324 in Miccolis v. Amica Mut. Ins.,
Co.,325 the court held that a previable fetus was not a person under the
Wrongful Death Act.326 There the court stated:
[T]he overwhelming majority view in this country is that a nonviable
fetus has no right to bring an action for wrongful death. . . . The
language of the plurality opinion of Presley . . . is merely dictum and
has no precedential value, . . . [and] [w]e do not believe that the
Legislature intended a nonviable fetus to be defined as a “person”
within the meaning of the wrongful-death statute.327

26. South Carolina
In Fowler v. Woodward,328 the court held that a stillborn, viable
fetus was a person under the wrongful death act. The court relied on its
previous decision in a prenatal tort case where the child was later born
alive, which stated that a fetus “capable of independent life apart from
its mother is a person.”329 The court reasoned that if it is a person for
purposes of bringing a prenatal injury claim after birth, it is a person
entitled to “maintain an action . . . if death had not ensued,” as required
under the state’s wrongful death act.330 The court concluded that the
death of a viable fetus fulfilled all the requirements set out in the
wrongful death act.331
But in Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co.,332 the court held that
there was no cause of action for a stillborn, previable fetus.333
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
original).
330.
331.
332.
333.
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Id.
Id. at 754.
In fact, the court stated that it was disregarding the allegation of viability. Id.
Miccolis v. Amica Mut. Ins., Co., 587 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991).
Id. at 71.
Id. (citations omitted).
Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 45 (S.C. 1964).
Id. at 44 (quoting Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (S.C. 1960)) (emphasis in the
Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (Law Co-Op 1962)).
Id.
Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 532 S.E.2d 856 (S.C. 2000).
Id. at 857.
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Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, this court reasoned that
only by legislative action could it extend a wrongful death action to
include a previable fetus.334 In dictum, and in response to a dissenting
opinion, the court stated that if this fetus had been born alive, that alone
was evidence that it was viable because it lived independent from its
mother.335
27. Vermont
In Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc., 336 the
Vermont Supreme Court first held that a stillborn, viable fetus was a
person under the wrongful death act.337 The court recognized that there
was a split in authority, but it reasoned that the cause of action should be
recognized because once a fetus reached viability, there was no reason to
permit a cause of action if the death occurred just after birth, but to deny
it if it occurred just before birth.338 Further, after viability, the fetus was
a “presently existing person” because it had the ability to survive
separately from its mother.339 Finally, the court recognized that to deny
this claim would permit the tortfeasor to benefit from the greater harm
caused (death), when the tortfeasor would be liable for the lesser harm
(injury) caused to a fetus at this stage of development.340
28. Washington
In Moen v. Hanson,341 the en banc Washington Supreme Court,
analyzing a claim for the wrongful death of a stillborn, viable fetus, first
acknowledged that this was being brought as a wrongful death action,
and not as a survival action.342 The court held that this fetus was a minor
child within the meaning of the state’s wrongful death act.343 The court
stated that there was no “lower age limitation . . . implied” by the term
minor child used to create this cause of action, which was enacted for the

334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980).
337. Id. at 94-95.
338. Id.
339. Id. (quoting White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617, 622 (Nev. 1969)).
340. Id. at 94-95.
341. Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975).
342. Id. at 266. A Washington court of appeals held that a stillborn, viable fetus was also a
person under the state’s survival statute in Cavazos v. Franklin, 867 P.2d 674 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994).
343. Moen, 537 P.2d at 268.
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benefit of the parents.344 Further, it stated that most jurisdictions have
recognized this cause of action for a viable fetus and that problems that
may arise related to causation and damages should not prevent the cause
of action.345
29. Wisconsin
In Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,346 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a stillborn, viable fetus was a person
under the state’s wrongful death act.347 The court, finding that most
jurisdictions would recognize this cause of action,348 stated that there
were four reasons to allow recovery here. (1) “A viable child is capable
of independent existence and therefore should be recognized as a
separate entity entitled to the protection of the law.” (2) An unborn child
is protected under other laws. (3) To deny the claim would be to allow
the tortfeasor to benefit from causing the greater harm, as a cause of
action for injuries only would have been available. (4) The family has
suffered a loss even if the fetus dies before it is born.349
C. Previability - No Live Birth Requirement
A clear minority of six (arguably seven)350 jurisdictions provide a
cause of action for the wrongful death of an embryo or previable fetus.351
Of the six, five permit the cause of action at any point during
gestation.352 Georgia alone uses “quickening” as the point when a
wrongful death action is recognized.353
1. Georgia
In Porter v. Lassiter,354 the statutory basis for the claim raised
provided that a parent could “recover for the homicide of a child.”355
344. Id. at 267.
345. Id. at 267-68.
346. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W. 2d 107 (Wis. 1967).
347. Id. at 111-12.
348. Id. at 110.
349. Id. at 110-11.
350. Michigan’s case and codified law are discussed separately in Section IV. See infra notes
386-439 and accompanying text.
351. See infra notes 354-85 and accompanying text.
352. See infra notes 358-85 and accompanying text.
353. See infra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
354. Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)
355. Id. at 102 (citation to statute omitted).
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The court started its analysis by stating that under Georgia’s criminal
laws, the killing of a “quick” child was murder, while the killing of a
child before “quickening” was only a misdemeanor.356 Based on this
distinction and the words of the statute creating the cause of action here,
the court held that there could be no cause of action for the death of a
fetus before it was “quick.”357
2. Illinois
An Illinois statute provides, “The state of gestation or development
of a human being . . . at death, shall not foreclose maintenance of any
cause of action . . . arising from the death of a human being caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default.”358 In Seef v. Sutkus,359 the fetus was
stillborn at 38-weeks gestational age.360 The court there held that loss of
society damages were appropriate because the statute defined this fetus
as a person, and under Illinois law, loss of society damages were
appropriate pecuniary damages under the wrongful death act.361
3. Louisiana
In Danos v. St. Pierre,362 the Louisiana Supreme Court first held
that there was no cause of action for the death of a six or seven month
gestational age fetus, but on rehearing, a divided court held that there
was.363 The court stated that to bar this cause of action would “benefit
the tortfeasor who causes a more serious injury, since the tortfeasor
would have to pay damages if his fault cause[d] a child to be born
disabled, but would not have to pay any damages if his fault cause[d]
prenatal death.”364 The court also relied on a “recent legislative
pronouncement . . . that a human being exists from the moment of
fertilization and implantation.”365 Finally, the court stated “We believe
the infant is a child from the moment of its conception . . . and that the
injury or killing of it, in its mother’s womb, is covered by the statute . . .
356. The court defined a quick unborn child as one who is “so far developed as to move or stir
in the nother’s wonb.” Id. (citations omitted.)
357. Id. at 103.
358. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.2 (1989).
359. Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1991).
360. Id. at 511.
361. Id.
362. Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.2d 633 (La.1981).
363. Id. at 639.
364. Id. at 638.
365. Id.
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giv[ing] the bereaved parents a right of action against the guilty parties
for their grief, and mental anguish.”366
4. Missouri
In Missouri, a state constitutional provision requires that “[t]he laws
of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf
of the unborn child at every stage of development, all rights, privileges
and immunities available to other persons.”367
Applying this
constitutional provision to the state’s wrongful death statute, the
Missouri Supreme Court stated: “[W]e cannot avoid the conclusion that
the legislature intended the courts to interpret ‘person’ within the
wrongful death statute to allow a natural parent to state a claim for the
wrongful death of his or her unborn child, even prior to viability.”368
5. South Dakota
In South Dakota, there is a cause of action “[w]henever the death or
injury of a person, including an unborn child, shall be caused by a
wrongful act.”369 In Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms,370 the wrongful
death claim involved a fetus of seven-weeks gestational age.371 The
court held that the language of the statute provided a cause of action for
the death of this previable fetus.372 The court reasoned that because the
legislature had added the words “including an unborn child” to the
statute in 1984, it intended to expand “the class of persons covered by
the statute” beyond those born alive and viable fetuses.373 Further, the
court reasoned that when the words of a statute are clear, like the word
unborn here, it was confined to interpret those words according to their
plain meaning.374 And the court stated that this interpretation created no
constitutional issue regarding a woman’s right to abortion because “[a]
choice to abort sanctions a mother’s decision, not someone else’s.”375

366. Id. at 639 (quoting Johnson v. South N.O. Lt. & Traction, Co., No. 9,048 (Orl. App. 1923)
cert. den. No. 26,443 (La. 1924)).
367. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1969).
368. Connor v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo. 1995) (en banc).
369. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (Mitchie 1984).
370. Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W. 2d 787 (S.D. 1996).
371. Id. at 789.
372. Id. at 791.
373. Id. at 790.
374. Id. at 790-91.
375. Id. at 791.
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6. West Virginia
In West Virginia, the term person, as used in the wrongful death
act, encompasses a previable embryo or fetus.376 In Farley v. Sartin,377
plaintiff’s pregnant wife was killed in an auto accident.378 At the time of
the accident, she was 18-22 weeks pregnant.379 The court held that the
plaintiff could maintain a cause of action for the death of the previable
fetus under the state’s wrongful death action.380The court began
analyzing the claim by reviewing the purpose of the wrongful death act
and cases addressing liability for injuries suffered prenatally.381 The
court reasoned that because the wrongful death act was intended to
prevent a tortfeasor from escaping “all liability when the injuries were
severe enough to kill the victim[],”382 and because a child who was later
born alive could recover for an injury suffered previability,383 if it did
not permit a wrongful death cause of action for a previable fetus, then it
would defeat the intended purpose of the wrongful death act.384 “In our
judgment, justice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to walk away
with impunity because of the happenstance that the unborn child had not
yet reached viability at the time of death.”385
IV. WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION FOR AN UNBORN EMBRYO OR FETUS IN
MICHIGAN
A. Historically
In 1894, the Michigan Supreme Court first considered whether
damages were available for the death of an unborn embryo or fetus.386
The lower court had permitted the jury to award damages to the mother
for the loss of “society, enjoyment, and prospective services” of the
unborn embryo or fetus.387 The court reasoned that it “would not be
376. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 523 (W.Va. 1995).
377. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 522.
378. Id. at 523.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 525-29.
382. Id. at 525.
383. Id. at 528.
384. Id. at 533-34.
385. Id. at 533.
386. Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry. Co., 61 N.W. 11 (Mich. 1894). The court did not
discuss the gestational age of this embryo or fetus. See id.
387. Id. at 12.
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competent for the jury to . . . attempt to compensate for the sorrow and
grieving of the mother,”388 and the court discussed the speculative
nature of the damages.389 But the court did state that the mother’s own
physical pain and mental suffering was compensable, which “involv[ed]
to some extent a consideration of the nature of the injury, and cannot
exclude from the consideration . . . [the] mental suffering of the mother
by reason of such an injury [which] would be more intense than in the
case of the ordinary fracture of a limb.”390
In a 1968 plurality opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a
viable fetus was not a person under the wrongful death statute.391 In the
main opinion, the court stated that, because the statute was unambiguous
and in derogation of the common law, it was constrained to interpret it as
it was written.392
In 1971, in O’Neill v. Morse, the Michigan Supreme Court
overruled its 1968 plurality decision.393 The court held that there was a
claim under the wrongful death statute for the death of an unborn viable
fetus.394 In its reasoning, the court began with its recent decision where
it allowed an eight-year-old child to recover for injuries he suffered
prenatally.395 The court then stated that because there was a cause of
action for prenatal injuries, and because the wrongful death act was
intended to preserve an action that the decedent could have brought if he
or she had lived, it should permit this wrongful death cause of action for
the injuries suffered by this viable, unborn fetus.396 The court also
refuted similar contrary reasoning from Powers v. City of Troy, that an
unborn fetus was not a person.397 The O’Neill court stated that birth
cannot be the point at which we measure where life begins because “[a]
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Powers v. City of Troy, 156 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 1968).
392. Id. (citing Hogan v. McDaniel, 319 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tenn. 1958)).
393. O’Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971).
394. Id. at 788.
395. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971).
396. O’Neill, 188 N.W.2d at 786. Interestingly, if this reasoning was followed to its logical
conclusion, this case would create a cause of action for the death of a previable unborn as well
because, in Womack, the child was injured at four months gestational age. Womack, 187 N.W.2d at
219. Thus, he was injured previability and allowed to recover. Id. at 222. Therefore, based on the
O’Neill court’s reasoning, if death occurred as a result of an injury suffered previability, the
wrongful death cause of action should be preserved under the common law rule of tort recovery
permitted in O’Neill. Cf. Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994) (extending a cause of action for wrongful death for a viable fetus who died in utero as a
result of a surgical procedure performed on the mother before the fetus’s conception).
397. O’Neil, 188 N.W.2d at 786-88.
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fetus having died within its mother’s womb . . . will not come alive
when separated from her. [And] a fetus living within the mother’s
womb . . . will not die when separated from her, unless the manner, the
time[,] or the circumstances of separation constitute a fatal trauma.”398
In Toth v. Goree,399 a fetus of three months gestational age was
miscarried as a result of a car accident.400 The court held that a wrongful
death cause of action could not be maintained because the fetus was not
a person under the law.401 The court began its analysis by revisiting two
Michigan Supreme Court decisions: one that permitted an eight-year-old
child to recover for a prenatal injury suffered previability (Womack),402
and one that permitted a wrongful death cause of action of the death of a
viable fetus (O’Neill).403 The Toth court concluded that the ruling in
Womack was limited only to prenatal claims suffered previability that
were later brought by a child who was born alive,404 and that the ruling
in the O’Neill was limited only to the death of a viable fetuses.405 The
court also evaluated this claim in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Roe v. Wade.406 The court reasoned that, in light of Roe v. Wade, “[i]f
the mother can intentionally terminate the pregnancy at three months,
without regard to the rights of the fetus, it becomes increasingly difficult
to justify holding a third person liable to the fetus for unknowingly and
unintentionally, but negligently, causing the pregnancy to end at that
same stage.”407 Finally, the court stated that because no other
jurisdiction had permitted a wrongful death cause of action on behalf of
a three-month gestational age, previable fetus, it could not find a basis to
permit one here without legislative action.408
In Jarvis v. Providence Hospital,409 the unborn fetus’ mother was
398. Id. at 787.
399. Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
400. Id.
401. Id. at 302. See also Carter v. Hutzel Hosp., 1997 WL 33344935, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Aug. 26, 1997) (confirming that “[t]he wrongful death act does not create a cause of action for a
nonviable fetus not born alive”).
402. Id. at 300 (discussing Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971)).
403. Id. (discussing O’Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971)).
404. Id. “The only issue in this case [Womack] is whether a common-law negligence action
can be brought on behalf of a surviving child negligently injured during the fourth month of
pregnancy.” Id. (quoting Womack, 187 N.W.2d at 219) (emphasis added).
405. Toth, 237 N.W.2d at 302. The court in Toth stated, “[w]hile much of the language in
O’Neill is ambiguous as regards viability, it does tend to exclude the nonviable fetus from its
discussion.” Id. at 300-01.
406. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
407. Toth, 237 N.W.2d at 303-04.
408. Id. at 302.
409. Jarvis v. Providence Hospital, 444 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
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exposed to hepatitis when the fetus was three and one-half months
gestational age.410 When the fetus was of eight months gestational age,
the mother contracted hepatitis, and the unborn fetus died as a result.411
The court found that because the fetus was viable at the time of the
death, the timing of the injury causing event was irrelevant, and the court
held that there was a claim under the wrongful death act for this fetus’
death.412
A Michigan court again revisited the issue of whether there was a
wrongful death cause of action for a previable fetus in Fryover v.
Forbes.413 In Fryover, the court summarily overruled the appellate
court’s holding that a wrongful death action was available for the death
of an unborn fetus of 16-weeks gestational age.414 The court, stated that
there was no legislative intent to “create a cause of action for a
nonviable fetus not born alive.”415
Despite the court’s statement in Fryover, which seemed to indicate
that either viability or live birth was required, in McDowell v. Stubbs416
the court stated that viability was required before there was a cause of
action for the death of a fetus.417 In McDowell, twin fetuses were
delivered at approximately 20 weeks gestation.418 The fetuses had heart
rates at one and five minutes after delivery, respectively.419 One twin
had some spontaneous movement.420 Hospital records indicated that the
twins were “liveborn.”421 The twins were not viable at the time of their
birth because of their gestational age.422 Because the twins were born
alive, the appellate court reasoned that there was no additional
requirement that they also be viable.423 But the Michigan Supreme
Court summarily reversed the judgment of the court of appeals,424

410. Id. at 237.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 238-39.
413. Fryover v. Forbes, 446 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1989).
414. Fryover v. Forbes, 439 N.W.2d 284 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d, 446 N.W.2d 292 (Mich.
1989).
415. Fryover, 446 N.W.2d at 292.
416. Estate of McDowell v. Stubbs, 564 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1997).
417. Id.
418. Estate of McDowell v. Stubbs, 553 N.W.2d 634, 635 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), rev’d, 564
N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1997).
419. Id. at 635-36.
420. Id. at 636.
421. Id. at 635.
422. Id. at 636.
423. Id. at 637-38.
424. McDowell, 564 N.W.2d at 463.
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without discussing the fact that the twins had been born alive.425
Instead, the court, relying on the decision in Toth v. Goree,426 which held
that there was no cause of action for the death of a previable fetus that
had not been born alive, focused solely on the fact that the McDowell
twins were previable at the time that they were born alive, and it decided
that there was no cause of action under the wrongful death act.427 In his
dissent, Justice Cavanagh pointed out that Michigan followed the bornalive rule in criminal cases, and that the Toth court had not departed
from the born-alive rule in its decision.428
B. 1999 Amendatory Act
1. History
On March 19, 1997, House Bill No. 4524 was introduced.429 The bill
proposed an amendment to Michigan’s wrongful death act, by providing
a remedy for the death of “an individual,” and defining the term
“individual” to include “the live unborn offspring of a human being at
any time or stage of development from conception to birth.”430 The
legislature also added 600.2922a, which would have codified the
Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Womack. 431 Under this proposed
amendment, the personal representative for the estate of the unborn
embryo or previable fetus had the same right of recovery under the
wrongful death act as was available in the event of the death of a viable

425. Id.
426. Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich Ct. App 1975).
427. McDowell, 564 N.W.2d at 463.
428. Id.
429. H.B. 4524, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997).
430. Id. The amendment would have changed the words “a person” to “an individual.” Id.
House Leg. Analysis, H.B. 4524, April 18, 1992. Both the bill as first proposed and the statute in its
final form indicate that this is an “amendatory act.” H.B. 4524. Although the final form of the 1999
law does not specifically state this it is amending the general wrongful death act, it need not do so to
accomplish that change. See People ex rel. Harrington v. Wands, 23 Mich. 385 (1871); Lucas v.
Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm’rs, 348 N.W.2d 670-71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that “amendment by
implication is permitted without republishing or reenacting every previous statute affected by the
new law”).
431. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971) (holding that a child who was
negligently injured prenatally could bring a cause of action against the tortfeasor). The original
wording of section 600.2922a of House Bill 4524 stated, “A person who wrongfully or negligently
causes injury to an unborn child is liable for damages. As used in this section, ‘unborn child’ means
the live unborn offspring of a human being at any time or stage of development from conception
until birth.” H.B. 4524, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997).
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fetus or a person born alive, including the decedent’s pain and
suffering.432
By May 1998, all amendments proposed by House Bill No. 4524
were contained in 600.2922a.433 This substituted bill, passed by the
House on May 27, 1998, and by the Senate on June 10, 1998, imposed
liability on a tortfeasor for a wrongful or negligent act “against a
pregnant individual” resulting “in a miscarriage or stillbirth . . . or
physical injury to the embryo or fetus.”434 The new law took effect
January 1, 1999.435
A bill analysis published after the law was enacted stated that
before the law went into effect, there may have been no way “for the
[pregnant] woman or her family to secure civil” relief for these damages
because “the [current] law allow[ed] wrongful death actions only for
persons and viable fetuses.”436 Opponents to the new law felt that any
law “affording the embryo [or] fetus rights comparable to those now
held by persons . . . effectively establish[ed] new rights for fetuses [or]
embryos [which] could be subject to constitutional challenge.”437
Despite concerns about the bill’s focus “on the result of actions to the
embryo or fetus, and not on injury to the pregnant woman,”438 the bill’s
enactment was supported by Right to Life of Michigan and Planned
Parenthood Affiliates of Michigan.439
C. Analysis
Although the statute has not yet been interpreted in a published
opinion,440 the legislature’s apparent intent was to provide recovery for
the death of an embryo or fetus, without regard to viability.441 This
intent is also consistent with current Michigan tort law that permits a
432. House Leg. Analysis, H.B. 4524, (April 18, 1997).
433. House Leg. Analysis, H.B. 4524, (May 11, 1997).
434. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West 2000). Sub. H.B. 4524, 1998 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 1998).
435. The bill was signed into law on July 1, 1998 and became effective Jan. 1, 1999. Enrolled
H.B. 4524, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998).
436. Senate Fiscal Agency, S.B. 346, p. 3 (Aug. 4, 1998).
437. Id. at 4.
438. Id. Interestingly, the law was later amended to add the word “death.” S.B. 346, 2001
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2001). MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West Supp. 2003).
439. House Leg. Analysis, H.B. 4524, (May 11, 1998). MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2922a, as it was worded when it went into effect on Jan. 1, 1999, contained the same wording
as the bill supported by these groups in May of 1998.
440. In fact, in a recent case involving the miscarriage of a fetus of 17 ½ weeks gestational age,
neither the parties nor the court raised any discussion about the applicability of this statute.
McClain v. U. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 665 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
441. See supra notes 429-39 and accompanying text.
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child, later born alive, to recover for his or her injuries incurred at any
point during gestation.442 This interpretation would also be consistent
with the general intent of the wrongful death act; it would prevent a
tortfeasor from benefitting by causing death of, rather than just injury to,
the embryo or previable fetus.443 But in its current form, the act is, at
best, overly vague and ambiguous, and at worst, meaningless, as
demonstrated by the variety of ways the act has been discussed or
classified by legal scholars.
West Publishing has classified this act under the topic Assault and
Battery.444 In Michigan Civil Jurisprudence, the act is classified under
Damages to Pregnant Women.445 And in Michigan’s Non-Standard Jury
Instructions, Civil, the act is in the Stalking chapter and classified as a
wrongful act against a pregnant individual.446 These interpretations are
inconsistent with the apparent legislative intent in enacting this section,
but, after analyzing each section of the act, it is not difficult to see how
this confusion arose.
1. Numbering
This act is numbered § 600.2922a, and the wrongful death act is
numbered 600.2922.447 In Michigan, statutory numbering is done by the
Legislative Service Bureau448 under the authority given it by statute.449
In assigning the statutory number, the Legislative Service Bureau
evaluates the subject matter of the bill or law and assigns it a number,
keeping closely related materials as numerically near to each other as
possible.450 Here, the bill’s connection by numbering to the wrongful

442. See e.g. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971).
443. The “common-sense principles . . . apply equally as well to the death of a nonviable
unborn child as they do to a nonviable unborn child who suffers a tortious injury and survives birth
and a viable unborn child who suffers a tortious injury and dies en ventre sa mere.” Farley v. Sartin,
466 S.E.2d 522, 533 (W. Va. 1995).
444. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West 2000).
445. 7 MICH. CIV. JUR. DAMAGES § 38 (stating that the tortfeasor is liable for damages
resulting in a miscarriage or stillbirth). But the statute must have been intended to remedy more
than just harm that the mother incurred because those damages were already compensable before
the statute was enacted. See Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry. Co., 61 N.W. 11, 12 (Mich.
1894) (“the jury is allowed to consider. . ., for the purposes of compensation, not only the physical
pain, but also mental suffering”).
446. MICH. NON-STANDARD JURY INSTR. CIVIL § 23:05 (Cumm. Supp. 2003).
447. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 2000).
448. Id. at p. III.
449. Id. at §4.1105.
450. Telephone Interview with Roger Peters, Legal Editor, Legislative Service Bureau (April
2, 2003).
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death act and its legislative history show that the legislature clearly
intended this act to amend the wrongful death act to include a cause of
action for the stillbirth or death of an embryo or previable fetus.451
2. Catch line
The act’s catch line reads: “Wrongful or negligent act against
pregnant individual resulting in miscarriage, stillbirth, or injury to [or
death of]452 embryo or fetus”453 Although the catch line suggests that
this act creates a cause of action for the injuries suffered by a pregnant
woman, it is not a part of the statute and it cannot broaden or narrow the
meaning of the text of the statute.454 Therefore, the words “against [the]
pregnant individual,” in the catch line cannot narrow the meaning of the
words in the text, which specifically creates a cause of action for the
“miscarriage, stillbirth . . . or death of the embryo or fetus.”455
3. Provisions of Sec.2922a(1)
Section one of the act provides: “A person who commits a wrongful
or negligent act against a pregnant individual is liable for damages if the
act results in a miscarriage or stillbirth by that individual, or physical
injury to [or the death of]456 the embryo or fetus.”457 Before this law was
enacted, a woman already had a cause of action for her own injuries,
including those associated with a miscarriage,458 and so did a child who
suffered a previability prenatal injury and was later born alive.459 In
interpreting a statute, the courts presume “that the Legislature did not
intend to do a useless thing.”460 So here, the only “useful thing” done by
this section was to create a cause of action for the miscarriage, stillbirth,
or death of the embryo or previable fetus.461
451. “An amendment to a statute will generally be considered as a part of the original act and
the entire act as amended be given the construction which would be given it if the amendment were
a part of the original act.” Perry v. Hogarth, 246 N.W. 214, 215 (Mich. 1933) (citations omitted).
452. The words “or death of” were added in 2001. See supra note 439.
453. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West Supp. 2003).
454. Id. at § 8.4b.
455. Id. at § 600.2922a(1).
456. Id. at § 600.2922a. The legislature’s addition of these words further indicates its intent.
457. Id.
458. See, e.g., Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry. Co., 61 N.W. 11 (Mich. 1894).
459. See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971).
460. Recorders Court v. City of Detroit, 351 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
461. Amendments are to be given effect, and the purpose of any amendment is to change the
original act to better carry out the purpose for which it was enacted. Perry v. Hogarth, 246 N.W.
214, 215 (Mich. 1933).
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Upon further analysis, it also becomes clear that this provision was
not intended to be read alone, because, although it creates a cause of
action, it provides no information about who can bring the cause of
action or what damages are available for the miscarriage, stillbirth, or
death of an embryo or fetus.
Under the common law, there was no cause of action for the
stillbirth or death of a fetus, so the cause of action must be created by
statute.462 And where a cause of action is only created by statute, the
statute creates the exclusive remedy for the wrong, “unless the remedy is
plainly inadequate.”463 Read alone, this statute’s remedy is not
inadequate, it is missing, unless this act is read in pari materia464 with the
wrongful death act. Here, it is appropriate to read the two acts as being
in pari materia465 because both acts relate to the same common
legislative purpose: holding tortfeasors liable for acts that cause death.
As such, they should be read together.466 This later statute should be
read to supplement or compliment the wrongful death act.467 And it
should be interpreted as showing a legislative policy change intended to
permit a cause of action for the stillbirth or death of an embryo or
previable fetus, and the provisions of the state’s general wrongful death
act should be used to determine who can bring the cause of action and
what damages apply for the liability imposed under section 600.2922a
(1).
Accordingly, the most logical interpretation of who would bring the
cause of action would be a personal representative,468 who could recover
damages, including those for the embryo or previable fetus’s conscious
pain and suffering.469 This interpretation has created constitutional
concerns, as stated by the opponents of the original bill and multiple

462. Powers v. City of Troy, 156 N.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Mich. 1968).
463. Bell v. League Life Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), overruled in
part by Smith v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 597 N.W.2d 28 (Mich. 1999).
464. “It is a cannon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed
together so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the
same subject.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (7th ed. 1999).
465. This is appropriate, even though they do not reference each other. County Rd Ass’n v. Bd.
of State Canvassers, 282 N.W.2d 774, 780 (Mich. 1979).
466. Remus v. City of Grand Rapids, 265 N.W. 755, 756 (Mich. 1936).
467. See Ziegler v. Witherspoon, 49 N.W.2d 318, 329 (Mich.1951) (stating that a later act on
the same subject should be interpreted as supplementing or complimenting the earlier statute).
468. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 600.2922(2) (West 2000).
469. Id. at § 600.2922(6). Survival-type damages should be excluded in a claim based on the
death of an embryo or previable fetus, as they may raise Constitutional concerns. See infra notes
452 and accompanying text.
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legal scholars.470
4. Provisions of 600.2922a (2)(a)(b)(c)
This section of the act sets out exceptions to the liability imposed in
section one. It specifically states:
This section does not apply to any of the following:
(a) An act committed by the pregnant individual.
(b) A medical procedure performed by physician or other licensed
medical professional within the scope of his or her practice and
with the pregnant individual’s consent or the consent of an
individual who may lawfully provide consent on her behalf or
without consent as necessitated by a medical emergency.
(c) The lawful dispensation, administration, or prescription of
medication.471

Analyzed together, it appears that these sections were added to
protect a woman’s constitutionally protected rights to an abortion. But,
if this was the intent, then they are unnecessary, because it is neither
wrongful nor negligent for a woman to abort an embryo or previable
fetus.472 Therefore, section one would never apply, and there would be
no need for these exceptions.
5. Provisions of 600.2922a(3)(4)
These two sections provide: “(3) This section does not prohibit a
civil action under any other applicable law. (4) As used in this section,
‘physician or other licensed medical professional’ means a person
licensed under article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL
333.16101 to 333.18838.”
It does not appear that either of these sections creates additional
confusion. In fact, section three would be necessary to prevent the
exceptions addressed in number two from being too broadly
construed.473

470. Senate Fiscal Agency, S.B. 346, Aug. 4, 1998, p. 3. See, e.g., Wendy C. Shapero, Does a
Nonviable Fetus’s Right to Bring a Wrongful Death Action Endanger a Woman’s Right to Choose?
27 SW. U. L. REV. 325 (1993).
471. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 600.2922a(2)(a)(b)(c) (West Supp. 2003).
472. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
473. Other currently recognized causes of action, including common-law causes of action, are
retained against these persons by provision three. See Bristol Window & Door, Inc., v. Hoogenstyn,
650 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
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V. REDRAFTED VERSION OF THE ACT
Because of the numerous problems identified in the current version
of the act, it should be amended to reflect accurately the legistature’s
intent in enacting the law. Below is a suggested revision. This version
clarifies who may bring the claim and what damages are available, and it
protects a woman’s constitutional right to choose whether or not she will
carry an embryo or fetus to viability by excluding survival-type damages
that may be interpreted as granting constitutional personhood to the
embryo or fetus.
600.2922a Liability for Wrongful Death of an Embryo or Fetus
(1) Whenever a person’s wrongful or negligent act474 results in the
miscarriage, stillbirth, or death of the embryo or fetus, that person is
liable for those damages set forth in subsection (4) of this act.
(2) An action under this section must be brought by, and in the
name of, the personal representative of the estate the embryo or fetus.475
(3) The person or persons who may be entitled to damages under
this section are limited to those who would have been the parents,
grandparents, brothers, or sisters of the embryo or fetus.476
(4) The court or jury may award damages incurred by the embryo
or fetus’ estate for reasonable medical, hospital, funeral, and burial
expenses; and the court or jury may award damages for the loss of
society and companionship suffered by the persons entitled to damages
under subsection (3).477
(5) This section does not prohibit a civil action under any other
applicable law. 478

474. This wording eliminates the need for current subparts two and three because legal
abortions are not wrongful or negligent.
475. By permitting a personal representative to bring the cause of action on behalf of the
persons listed in sub-part three, it is clear that the cause of action survives, even if the pregnant
woman dies along with the fetus. There are no constitutional rights raised because a legal abortion
is neither wrongful or negligent.
476. Under the general wrongful death act, these persons would be entitled to recovery for their
losses. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 600.2922(3)(a) (West 2000).
477. By limiting the recoverable damages to those incurred by the persons listed, there is no
concern that the embryo or previable fetus is given constitutional rights of personhood because the
act would compensate living persons for their loss, without awarding survival-type damages.
478. This provision will retain all other causes of action currently available under statute or
common law. See Bristol Window & Door, Inc., v. Hoogenstyn, 650 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2002).
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VI. CONCLUSION
State legislatures need to take action to clarify whether a cause of
action can be maintained when an embryo or fetus dies as a result of a
wrongful or negligent act. And when they take action, they must do so
in a way that clearly states the answer.
Although some believe that allowing a personal representative to
bring a cause of action after the death of an embryo or previable fetus
may erode a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion, as discussed
above, with properly enacted legislation (1) the estate, which suffered
financial damages, and would-be family members who were deprived of
the future society and companionship may be compensated; (2) no
constitutional rights are conveyed to the embryo or previable fetus; and
(3) the pregnant woman’s constitutional right to chose whether to carry
the previable embryo or fetus to viability are protected.
To accomplish these things without eroding the woman’s right to
chose an abortion, the statute should not award any damages that convey
any right of personhood: survival-type damages. It should specifically
set out the damages recoverable by the estate and family members who
had the right to expect that this embryo or fetus would one day be a
member of his or her family, and compensate those persons for the
injuries they suffered as a result of the tortfeasor’s action. If these
guidelines are followed, the woman’s constitutional right would not be
infringed, and it would, instead, be better protected because the
tortfeasor would not be allowed to escape liability for his or her action
that deprived the woman of her right to chose whether to carry this
embryo or previable fetus to viability.
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